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Abstract 
Cotton production in the Francophone African Countries (FACs) derives exclusively from 
smallholders whose holding size is less than 5 ha on average. From the 1990s, the FACs are 
globally ranking third to second in exporting cotton to the world market. Such an achievement 
could be regarded as the result of an institutional construction which took place for four decades 
in dealing with the smallholders' constraints and concerns.  
Since the mid-1990s, the FACs are engaged into processes of privatization/liberalization, at 
distinct modalities, within the implementation of globalization-oriented policies. Drastic changes 
are now observed in pricing mechanisms, provision of inputs and credit to farmers...etc. These 
changes imply modifications in the responsibilities sharing between stakeholders, with modalities 
which are implying sometimes disharmony and uncertainty within the sector. This is an 
illustration of the construction-feature of new institutional arrangements which can hardly be 
automatically acceptable to all. The paper provides an analysis of the institutional construction in 
dealing with few major constraints or concerns faced by the smallholders in the FACs.  
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Politique cotonnière au Sud du Sahara : une question fondamentale 
d'arrangements institutionnels adaptés aux contraintes des paysans 
 
 
Résumé 
La production cotonnière dans les pays de l'Afrique Zone Franc (AZF) procède exclusivement 
des exploitations familiales d'une taille moyenne inférieure à 5 ha. A partir du début des années 
1990, les pays de l'AZF globalement se sont hissés au troisième voire second rang à l'exportation 
du coton dans le monde. Un tel aboutissement peut être considéré comme le résultat de quatre 
décennies de construction institutionnelle pour tenir compte des contraintes et des objectifs des 
paysans.  
Depuis le milieu des années 1990, ces pays sont engagés dans un processus de 
privatisation/libéralisation, suivant des modalités variables, dans le cadre d'une adaptation des 
politiques économiques à la mondialisation. Des changements drastiques sont aujourd'hui 
observés dans les domaines de mécanisme de fixation de prix, d'approvisionnement des 
producteurs en intrants et de fourniture de crédit… etc. Ces changements ont induit des 
modifications dans le partage des responsabilités entre les acteurs des secteurs coton, avec des 
modalités qui ont engendré dissension et incertitude au sein des secteurs. Tout cela est illustrative 
du caractère construit des arrangements institutionnels qui peuvent difficilement être acceptables 
d'emblée pour tous. Cet article propose une analyse de la construction institutionnelle pour 
appréhender les principales contraintes et/ou préoccupations des paysans producteurs des pays de 
l'AZF.  
 
Mots clés: Mondialisation, arrangement institutionnel, libéralisation, coton, histoire 
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1 Introduction 
The Francophone African countries (FACs) account for an increasing part of the cotton 
production and exportation in the world. In spite of having globally reached the second rank in 
the world exportations during the campaign 2001/02, the economic importance and 
characteristics of the cotton production in the FACs remain little known out of Africa. In 
particular, although technology progress contributed indeed to this achievement, few people are 
aware of the crucial role of successful institutional arrangements that induced the actual adhesion 
of farmers to cotton production. Furthermore, most external analysts still hold the image of rigid 
institutional arrangements inherited from the colonial times while these arrangements evolved a 
lot during the last five decades.  
We believe that the farmers adhesion to cotton production could be measured through the ways 
the institutional framework meets their constraints and concerns regarding a) price fairness, b) 
risk aversion, c) lack of financial resource (encompassing liquidity constraint in imperfect 
financial market, d) lack of competence, e) high transaction costs in getting inputs or in selling 
seedcotton. These constraints and concerns are nowadays acknowledged to be specific to 
smallholders in many developing countries [1-5]. We sustain that the institutional evolution from 
1950 to the beginning of the 1990 helped farmers to face their constraints and respond to their 
concerns. This seems to be somewhat threatened by the evolution which occurred from the mid-
1990s, towards a process of privatization/liberalization within the generalized acceptation of the 
globalization process. This is an indication that the new institutional arrangements derived from 
the privatization/liberalization processes are not yet satisfactory. Such a situation should not lead 
to excessive pessimism when the construction-feature of institutional arrangements is taken into 
account. The analysis of the construction of the former institutional arrangements, which proved 
to be successful ones, provides lessons in building new ones.  
In this paper, we first provide some data about the characteristics of the cotton production in the 
FACs. In a second part, we recall the basis of the institutional frame that was set up in the 1950s 
which actually launched this production [6] and we point out to what extent it complied with the 
smallholders' constraints and specificities. In a third part, we demonstrate that this compliance 
was strengthened during the institutional evolution that took place during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
the fourth part, we indicate how this compliance is getting loosened in the countries which 
embarked into a privatization/liberalization process and we try to identify what was wrong in the 
set up of the institutional arrangements which are taking place. 
2 Main characteristics of the FACs cotton production 
Cotton production progressed a lot during the second half of the last century in the FACs (Figure 
1) where it is concentrated mainly in 9 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Chad and Togo). These countries are located in areas where it was 
evidenced that rainfalls have become less abundant during the last 3 decades, in Sahelian zones 
and south of these zones, in terms of volume of precipitations and number of days with rains [7, 
8]. Except in Côte d'Ivoire, the spinning industry seldom exists so that the local consumption of 
cotton lint accounts only for a tiny share of the national productions. The exportation of raw 
cotton is of paramount economic importance in most of the FAC where it may represent more 
than 50% of foreign currency earnings (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin). 
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Figure 1. Shares of the FACs in the world cotton production and exportation 
The FACs are also among the poorest countries in the world, in particular the landlocked 
countries like Mali or Burkina Faso (Table 1). The total population is close to 90 millions with 
more than 60% living in rural areas. It is estimated that 16 millions of human beings, close to 
30% of the rural population, have cash income related to cotton production. This is an indication 
of how crucial the continuation of the cotton production is for the poverty alleviation in the 
related areas.  
Table 1 : Macro-economic indicators in the FACs  
 Total population 
(103 in 2001) 
Rural 
population (103 
in 2000) 
Rural population 
w/cotton income 
(103 in 2000) 
GDP/capita 
US $ 
(2001) 
Adult literacy 
rate (% in 2001)
Benin 6 446 5 207 2 500 368 37,4 
Burkina Faso 11 856 8 320 3 000 196 23,9 
Cameroon 15 200 9 640 1 300 644 75,8 
Central Africa 3 782 2 037 900 247 46,7 
Côte d'Ivoire 16 349 8 562 1 600 563 46,8 
Mali 11 677 8 642 2 000 242 41,5 
Senegal 9 662 5 635 500 477 37,3 
Chad 8 135 5 415 3 000 183 42,6 
Togo 4 657 2 723 1 200 266 57,1 
Total/average 87 764 56 181 16 000 354 45,5 
 
The adult literacy rate is a common indicator of human development. In this regard, the FACs 
suffer from a small rate level although there is some variation between the countries. Wholly 
speaking, less than half of the adult population is literate and this rate should be far lower in rural 
areas: it is seldom possible to encounter adult farmers having been to school. Compensation took 
place during the 1980s owing to literacy programs in local languages organized within the 
associative process in the cotton zones. Nowadays, a significant part of farmers are capable of 
dealing with documents in local languages. 
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Cotton production derives mainly from manual farms in most of the FACs, under strictly rainfed 
conditions. Only Mali distinguishes itself by the popularization of animal-drawn agriculture so 
that only a small share of the peasants is strictly conducting manual farming (Table 2). The 
average cotton area by farm seldom exceeds 1.5 ha, except in Mali where mechanization of soil 
preparation and sowing enables to cope with a higher acreage which remains small (2.3 ha). 
Although some observers still have the wrong feeling that cotton production competes against 
food production, the cotton share in the cropping system does not exceed 30% of the cultivated 
area. Data from specific surveys demonstrate that cotton farmers are better food secured than 
non-cotton ones: apart from comparable food-crop production, cotton farmers hold the advantage 
of not having to sell out food excess at low prices at the harvest times in order to meet their 
liquidity needs (Table 3). 
 
Table 2: Economy of cotton production in FAC 
 Lint 
production 
(103 tons in 
2000/1) 
Cotton lint 
yield (kg/ha 
in 2000/1) 
Cotton area 
(103 ha in 
2000/1) 
Average 
area per 
cotton farm 
(ha) 
% cotton in 
cropping 
system 
% manual 
farms 
Benin 141 418 337 1,7 30,0% 60,0% 
Burkina Faso 116 423 275 1,4 38,0% 60,0% 
Cameroon 95 478 199 0,5 24,0% 70,0% 
Central Africa 10 267 39    
Côte d'Ivoire 125 504 248 1,7 44,0% 70,0% 
Mali 102 447 228 2,3 35,0% 15,0% 
Senegal 9 404 22 1,1 20,0% 50,0% 
Chad 58 242 240    
Togo 49 362 135   85,0% 
Total/average 705 409 1 723 1,45 31,8% 58,6% 
Note: The production in Mali was halved as compared to the preceding campaign as a 
consequence of a farmers' protest (refusal to sow cotton to obtain higher price) which concerned 
mainly 2 of the 6 cotton production areas. 
 
Table 3: Cereal excess per capita in Mali (after deduction of 250 kg/person/year) 
 Cotton growing Non-cotton growing 
 1992 1998 1992 1998 
Advanced ox-draught equipped 
farms 
170 239 122 334 
Ox-draught equipped farms 156 230 244 302 
No or little ox-draught equiped 
farms 
25 42 67 3 
 
In spite of their lack of production means, farmers in the FACs achieve yield levels which are 
quite commendable, close to what is achieved in some cotton areas in the USA where rainfed 
production dominates (Figure 2). 
Due to the general poverty of the related countries, one may keep the image of a technologically 
backward cotton production. This is not true. Technology progress accounted to a significant part 
in the production increase and competitiveness. For instance, it is observed that the process of 
variety change was quite close to the one encountered for the main crops in developed countries 
(Table 4).  
Breeding led to a very high level of ginning outturn (an average of 42% with some countries 
close to 44-45% like in Côte d'Ivoire) and a significant increase in the fiber quality as illustrated 
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through the lint length (Table 5). Besides, chemical pest control remains reasonable, with an 
average of 4 applications. Dosages tend also to decrease by a combination of calendar application 
program and scouting [9] : Mali is the country where there is evidence that it is feasible to have 
illiterate farmers coping with scouting cotton pest and deciding on the right chemical to use [10].  
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Figure 2. Comparative lint yield in Côte d'Ivoire and US Southeast 
Table 4: Adoption rate of new cotton varieties from 1955 to 1993 
 Number of varieties 
adopted 
No. Of varieties 
adopted on a large scale
Average lifespan of varieties 
adopted at large scale (years)
Senegal 7 6 6.7 
Mali 10 9 4.4 
Burkina Faso 14 9 4.4 
Côte d'Ivoire 12 12 3.3 
Togo 8 7 5.7 
Benin 11 8 5.0 
Cameroon 15 12 3.3 
Chad 14 9 4.4 
Centralafrica 
Republic 
14 9 4.4 
Source: [11] 
With reference to what generally occurred in developing countries, one may also have the feeling 
that farmers are under the mercy of merchants or unscrupulous agents when they sell their cotton 
production. This is neither true in the case of cotton in the FACs where nearly 90% of the 
production are commercialized by the farmers themselves (100% in the main countries like Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin). This is a consequence of the externalization of the 
seedcotton trade from the cotton companies to farmers' organizations, for which these latter get 
specific remuneration on pre-agreed basis. 
In a nutshell, cotton production in the FACs is an outcome of resource-less farmers with however 
commendable technological achievements, in spite of unfavourable climatic trend. These 
achievements unveil the farmers' adhesion to this production, thanks to institutional arrangements 
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that comply with their constraints and which favoured the adoption of the proposed technological 
progress. 
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Table 5: Gains in ginning outturn and Quality 
% fiber attaining this length, inch  Periods Gin. outturn 
% <1-1/16" 1-1/16" >1-1/16" 
1970-75 36,3 97,8 2,2  
1975-80 37,5 67,3 31,5 1,2 
1980-85 39,2 5,2 67 27,8 
Burkina Faso 
1985-90 41,3 21,7 73,2 5,1 
1970-75 37 91,4 8,6  
1975-80 38,4 90 10  
1980-85 38,7 56,3 41,1 2,5 
Cameroon 
1985-90 40,3 3,8 34,2 61,9 
1970-71 39,7 46,3 53,7  
1975-76 40,2 51,9 44,5 3,6 
1980-81 40,8 3,8 70,7 25,5 
1985-86 43,6  91,7 8,3 
Côte d'Ivoire 
1990-91 44,3  21,2 78,8 
Source: [11] 
3 Radical change of institutional framework to cope with farmers constraints 
Some academic works refer to the cotton production in the FACs as the outcome of the 
application of a "French system" or "CFDT system" (Compagnie Française de Développement 
des Fibres Textiles, erected in 1949 as a joint jointure with the French State having the major 
shareholding. This company changed its name in 2001 to DAGRIS. It has become Geocoton 
since its privatization in early 2008), based upon a strong integration within a cotton company 
which is endowed with the monopsony power in its intervention zone [12]. This historical 
reference is not correct. Such a system was initiated explicitly by Belgium, in 1921, in their 
former colony which is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, probably influenced by what 
Germany started to promote in the Benin Gulf before the end of WW1 [13]. The Belgian system 
inspired quickly other colonial powers, in particular Portugal which adopted it in Mozambique 
and Angola [14]. The reference to the "CFDT system" is also misleading since it occults more 
than half a century of the French failure in promoting cotton production in Africa since the mid-
19th century [13, 15, 16]. 
Although aware of how the Belgian system worked, and in spite of the advocacy to adopting it 
[17], the French colonial administration kept on relying upon the competition rules till 1950. 
Finally, as a matter of paradox, the French government was singular in adopting very lately a 
system which is referred nowadays to be a French outcome. Nevertheless, this system helped 
meet the farmers' constraints and concerns in the areas of a) price fairness, b) risk aversion, c) 
lack of financial resource (encompassing liquidity constraint in imperfect financial market, d) 
lack of competence, e) high transaction costs in getting inputs or in selling seedcotton. 
It was only in 1952, at a conference in Dakar devoted to launching commodities production in the 
French colonies, that CFDT proposed a policy [18] which eventually took place in the former 
French-Sudan (which covered locations corresponding to Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte 
d'Ivoire).  
This policy emphasized the need to propose an equitable price to farmers because no-one would 
accept to grow for non-profitability: this was a dramatic change with regard to the approach 
followed earlier. It advocated an early announce of the seedcotton price, before the sowing period, 
and the respect of the announced price at the buying time. In order to discourage farmers from 
delaying their harvest in the expectation of higher price late in season (which would have been 
detrimental to quality), a stable price all over the purchase season was advocated, as well as a 
uniform price all over a given colonial territory. To ensure quality, price differentials were set up 
in order to encourage farmers to sort their production at the harvest stage. Pre-announcement of 
price to farmers was only feasible if price could be settled too at the exportation stage. This was 
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the rationale of having the French textile industry to commit itself in a pre-agreed exportation 
price. This was actually accepted; it worked for three years but not renewed [6]. However the 
experience gained led to establishing stabilization funds that run till recent years. All the price 
mechanism set in place was targeted at alleviating the farmers' risk aversion. 
The engagement in paying farmers within a short delay, generally at the time of buying what 
farmers brought to the markets, responded to the farmers' lack of liquidity.  
The new pricing mechanism and the modalities of payment are clearly addressing the issues of 
farmers risk aversion and lack of financial resources in addition to ensuring equitable enough 
price to cotton producers. 
The constraint of lack of financial was addressed also in the objective of increasing productivity. 
The analysis presented in 1952 suggested that intensification was costly and that farmers could 
hardly support the real cost. This observation influenced the subsidy policies which took place in 
the 1960s, firstly for the production equipment, then for fertilizers and finally for insecticides. 
Since there were no banks in rural areas at that time while farmers had no cash, it looked obvious 
that the supply of equipment and input, although at subsidized prices, must be implemented on 
credit basis, with repayment operated at the seedcotton purchase stage. This credit procedure was 
the cornerstone of an integration system which set up gradually leading to the monopsony system 
which eventually prevailed1. 
Transportation of the seedcotton from villages to the collecting points was a transaction cost 
ensured by farmers, and the distance was sometimes discouraging. This observation led to decide 
on increasing the number of collecting points and contributed to alleviate farmers' transaction 
costs. 
Another observation pertained to the lack of productivity at the farmers' level. It was advocated to 
actually implement cotton research and to help farmers embarking into productivity gain through 
a more intensified production mode. CFDT pointed out that the messages on new techniques 
must be disseminated by a specific and trained staff to farmers who lacked competence in 
growing cotton, this was the starting point of the networks of extension staff that are encountered 
in the FACs cotton areas, clearly considering the issue of improving farmers' technical 
competence in new production mode. 
In all the FACs, the same system was launched with more or less delay. The implementation of 
the subsidy policies to achieve a more intensified agriculture was backed by the launching of 
development projects, funded firstly by the French government, then by the European Economic 
Community. This system worked till mid-1970s and it experienced afterwards a dramatic change 
which contributed to better respond to the farmers' constraints and concerns. 
 
Looking back to the set up of the institutional framework which gave the "CFDT system" enables 
to point out four important lessons in the area of the construction of institutional arrangements. 
First, the whole "CFDT system" was not set up once and for all; it was gradually built by adding 
complementary bricks on solidly anchored cornerstones. Second, it took time to have the 
cornerstones be put in place and a specific alliance between the most concerned players was 
required: in particular, it was because the colonial administration accepted to allow low import 
taxes of French textile products that the French textile industry accepted to commit itself in 
buying the African cotton, which was not known at all in the market, at a guaranteed price. Third, 
experience is necessary to test the feasibility, efficacy and soundness of new institutional 
arrangements and hence to finally find out the right path: no matter that the French Textile 
industry did not renew its commitment in buying African cotton lint at a guaranteed price. 
Actually, by the mid-1950s, after the fear of cotton scarcity vanished, the French textile industry 
 
1 It must be noted that it was only in 1954/55 that CFDT got the right to commercialize seedcotton, along with 
private operators who finally withdrew gradually. It was only at the Independence of the African countries that the 
CFDT monopsony status was formalized in 1960. 
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had no longer motivation in securing their raw material supply from the French colonies and it no 
longer accepted to pay extra-cost for that. In other words, after the WW2, the commitment of the 
French textile industry in promoting the cotton production in the FACs did not last more than 
three years. What happened during these three years enabled nevertheless all stakeholders to 
ascertain the soundness of the measures proposed in the analysis carried out in 1952. Fourth, the 
player who advocated for a new institutional framework and finally benefited, along with other 
players, was not the most dominant one. 
4 Period of strengthening the institutional evolution to respond to the farmers' 
constraints and concerns 
In the area of cotton production, the FACs are well known for their achievements in the 
associative process of the cotton villages: this process enabled farmers to implement by 
themselves the commercialization of seedcotton they produced along with the management of the 
input credit they obtained [19, 20]. This process took place in 1974 in Mali [6] and spread to the 
other countries at the point that seedcotton is almost commercialized totally by the cotton farmers 
themselves, by the end of the 1980s. It induced an empowerment of the farmers' organizations 
which led them to, nowadays, jointly monitor the cotton sector in some countries through the 
signature of contractual commitment involving the cotton company, the State and the farmers' 
national representation [21, 22].  
This contractual process dealt in particular with a new pricing mechanism from the end of the 
1990s, a dramatic institutional evolution without moving out the integration scheme and which 
contributed to better respond to farmers' constraints and concerns [23]. By having their say in the 
pricing mechanism, farmers gained better equitability since the purchase price became more 
connected to the world market price through a two-step payments procedure [23]. 
In the area of risk aversion, the associative process ensured farmers with the procurement of the 
input at the quantities and at the time they needed. They were protected from being cheated in the 
assessment of the quantity and of the quality of the seedcotton they produced. Application of 
intensification techniques encompassed risks. Although the approach of subsidizing the input use 
was questioned by the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Plans, the intensification 
option remained secured through an efficient network to maintain the devices of ox-drawn 
agriculture and of insecticide spraying. These networks are based upon the village blacksmiths 
which were trained and assisted in their equipment. Nowadays, many blacksmith workshops are 
capable of repairing many motorized devices, in particular motorbikes, flour-grinders… 
By taking over a service of commercializing seedcotton, the farmers' organizations obtained 
compensation which improved their financial resources and helped them in implementing 
collective investments in their villages. In Mali, the collective financial resources, obtained from 
taking over the commercialisation of seedcotton, evolved from less than FCFA 100 millions in 
1982 to FCFA 500 millions in 1992 [6].  It is estimated to be FCFA 2700 millions for the current 
2003/04 campaign (or $ 2.6 per inhabitant related to the cotton production). 
The production increase along the period implied multiplication of the seedcotton collection spots 
at the point that most farmers sold their cotton production at the gate of their villages, decreasing 
seriously the related transaction cost.  
The transfer of responsibility to farmers, namely in managing input credit and seedcotton 
marketing was only effective after a proper training of the farmers in the areas of book keeping 
and management, which corresponded to an assistance to upgrade the farmers' competence 
beyond the conventional area of technical practices.  
 
As during the former period, the institutional arrangements took place gradually and they 
benefited from the alliance of the stakeholders. In the opposite of what happened earlier, it was 
the international funders of rural development, in particular the World Bank, along with bilateral 
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cooperation funds from France, the Netherlands…who took the lead by financing many actions to 
help train and equip the village blacksmiths, to help evolve the extension system [6]. 
The positive experience of involving the village blacksmiths in the cotton production provides 
another important lesson. The decision to involve them came only after several failures in 
ensuring the maintenance of the farmers' cultivation devices. What seems to be natural nowadays 
was not thought to be so at that time. This is an indication of the inevitability of engaging into a 
learning-by-doing process to eventually come to acceptable then successful institutional 
arrangements. 
The involvement of the international funders got deeper and deeper during this period. These 
funders did not only help the stakeholders directly concerned by the cotton production to 
implement the strategy these latter set up, they also imposed the strategies they favoured in 
compliance with their ideologies of rural development. There was little divergence of strategies 
when training and promotion of village blacksmiths was concerned. Some divergence appeared 
when the mechanism of price fixing was questioned. This divergence was overcome, and 
eventually led to evolve from a fixed price to a minimum price in connection with the world 
market price, because there was no opposition from all of the direct stakeholders. Such a 
collective opposition appears towards the advocacy of privatization/liberalization which finally 
takes place, as an example of imposed institutional arrangement to which adaptation is required 
to go beyond the outcomes so far obtained. 
5 Current period of uncertainty and threat induced by an unstable 
liberalization process 
5.1. Reasons, scope and modalities of the liberalization process in the FACs cotton 
sectors 
The serious crisis that affected the cotton world market in the 1991/92 plunged the FACs cotton 
sectors into deep financial crisis. It led some experts, in particular those from the World Bank, to 
preach the relevance of a deep change of these sectors organization, advocating a privatization 
which would ensure a more efficient management and a liberalization that would help farmers 
benefiting from price competition between several seedcotton buyers [24]. Such a proposition 
rose passionate debate [25-28] and the opposition demonstrated certainly tempered the rhythm of 
the liberalization process. Nowadays, this process actually covers only part of related countries, 
under diversified modalities which do not pertain to a pure liberalization and which are difficult 
to sum up properly. 
Up to now, Benin is the country that embarks into the most radical change with regard to the 
former organization. Ginning is opened to several private operators whose activities are limited to 
gin seedcotton (and sell the resulting lint and seeds) according to quotas that the State 
administered according to a much debated criteria. The former para-statal cotton company was 
announced to be totally privatized since 1998. Its activities in technical advice and input 
provision were gradually reduced and transferred to a cotton-sector organization (Association 
Inter-professionnelle Cotonnière) led by a Federation of farmers' organizations (FUPRO). Till 
now, this privatization has not materialized. Input acquisition and distribution were privatized 
since 1992/93 but under modalities that ensured private distributors of having not any risk to bear 
[29, 30]. Purchase price of seedcotton remains administered, but following a new calculation 
formula. A new mechanism was set up in 1999 to keep on associating the seedcotton purchase 
with the recovery of the input credit in spite of the privatization process. 
In Côte d'Ivoire, the change that took place in 1998 corresponded to the replacement of a national 
monopsony endowed to a para-statal by three regional monopsonies, through the establishment of 
two new companies involving international private capitals. A gradual move was defined to 
ensure, during a transitional period of two years, the continuation of the seedcotton purchase as 
well as the input and credit provision according to previous rules. The option of transferring the 
management of the cotton sector to a cotton-sector body led by the farmers' organizations was 
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retained. A new formula of calculations in determining the seedcotton purchase price was 
implemented too, by taking into account explicitly the farmers' production costs. Research 
organization was restructured in 1999 with a shareholding open to a federation of farmers' 
cooperatives so that theoretically producers become more active in orienting research activities. 
Since 2003, the regional monopsony scheme was disturbed by the operation of a new ginnery 
owned by a federation of farmers' cooperatives which has no allocation of intervention area and 
which contests the three established companies. In 2007, one of the private company (LCCI) was 
liquidated because it has not totally paid the seedcotton it got from farmers' cooperatives, for 
several years. 
Togo has only allowed a new private ginner to operate along with the existing para-statal. In 2007, 
this ginnery has collapsed, many farmers have not been paid for the cotton they marketed for 
several years. 
Mali has resisted for a long time to a liberalization process. In 2003, it was decided that the 
national monopoly will be split into 2 or 3 regional monopolies, and many assistance services 
that the cotton company provided to farmers will be ended up or transferred to other organisms. 
Around one third of the extension staff was laid off within the main cotton company (CMDT or 
Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles). In 2005, the privatization was 
postponed to 2008. At the end of 2007, four subsidiaries were created as a gradual stage before 
privatization which is not materializing because the bad financial shape of the cotton company is 
not making it at all attractive. 
Burkina Faso escaped from the liberalization firstly by opening in 2003 the shareholding of the 
unique cotton company to farmers who are most represented in the monitoring device that was set 
up. In 2006, two new cotton companies with private capital were erected and the inter-
professional monitoring of the cotton sector was put in place. 
Senegal has retained the same scheme of opening the shareholding of the unique cotton company 
to farmers. This unique company was later on privatized, in 2003, and became a subsidiary of 
DAGRIS. 
In Chad, the privatization process has been retained for many years but it is not yet materialized. 
Modalities of the privatization are still harshly debated. 
Cameroon is the country where the privatization or liberalization process is under debate for a 
long time but still with no precise options coming out. 
5.2. Questionable outcomes 
With regard to the five criteria that accounted in the farmers' adhesion to cotton production, there 
are unfortunately signs of negative trends which are threats for the continuation of this adhesion 
although they are not encountered in all countries. 
In the area of price fairness, the fact that farmers have got the lead in the monitoring body of the 
cotton sector is positive. Such a body has its say in determining the purchase price to farmers and 
it has been at the origin of the adoption of new calculation formulas which takes into account 
farmers' real costs of production. Nevertheless, the formula is questioned only one year after its 
adoption in Côte d'Ivoire where it is decided to abandon it and where the cotton stakeholders are 
in seek of a more acceptable procedure. Such a situation is indicating that a common vision of 
equitability is missing. All cotton sectors in the FACs are still looking after a more efficient price 
mechanism. 
In the area of risk aversion, price announcement has become far later than before, most often just 
prior to the seedcotton commercialization period instead of pre-sowing period. Furthermore, price 
retained at the commercialization time could have been lower than previously announced (Côte 
d'Ivoire). There are also cases of cotton production not being actually commercialized (Benin) for 
various reasons. In Benin, owing to the fact that the seedcotton quotas are allocated to private 
ginners without consideration of the distances between ginneries and production locations, 
evacuation duration is longer, with higher risk of quality depreciation leading the ginners to 
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refusing ginning and paying the related seedcotton. It is also in Benin where there were more 
farmers' complaints about the quality of the input they obtain. It was partly due to the coincidence 
with a serious outbreak of insect resistance to pyrethroids during the 1996 to 1998 campaigns. 
There were frequent complaints pertain to the late delivery of inputs and to their shortness with 
regard to the expected quantities2. Since 2006, it is reported that farmers did not even get the 
seeds at the quantities and qualities they were accustomed to[31]. 
No more consideration was paid to the smallholders' feature of lack of financial resources before 
the implementation of the privatization/liberalization process, subsidy was phased out totally in 
most of the FACs. This situation remained unchanged afterwards, although farmers had got the 
lead in the monitoring the cotton sector. Further worst, it is in Benin where it is reported that 
acquisition price of inputs is higher, even higher than in landlocked countries. Since 2006, several 
governments of the FACs have allocated some subsidy to diminish the input prices, after their 
cotton producers complained against the profitability reduction of cotton production, at the time 
when they have engaged their crusade against cotton subsidies at the WTO arena. 
Farmers' liquidity constraint has become higher as a consequence of a dramatic increase in the 
delay to pay farmers after they sold their production. The worst case is experienced in Côte 
d'Ivoire. In one region of this country, where one international investor is involved, many farmers 
have started experiencing very delayed payment since the 2001/02 campaign. No wonder why 
some farmers have withdrawn themselves from growing cotton. 
Financial market remains very imperfect, and it is actually lacking in rural areas of FACs. Input 
credit associated to cotton production remains crucial. The option of having farmers' 
organizations taking over the responsibility in supplying input on credit basis looks positive on its 
principles (such responsibility transfer pertains often to the supply of "non-strategic" input like 
herbicides or mineral fertilizers for cereal crops) but it is not yet showing convincing results. In 
Côte d'Ivoire, the repayment rate of such kind of credit is very low (20-30%) which questions the 
sustainability of the scheme. In Benin, the farmers' organization (CAGIA) copes with the supply 
of all kinds of inputs and is regarded as being responsible of the delay in the delivery during the 
2002/03 campaign for the reason mentioned above. Furthermore, disputes between farmers and 
their representatives regarding this issue of input distribution has become a permanent item that 
pushes the President of the country to intervene. In Mali, the farmers' organizations have failed in 
ordering the needed inputs on time and at the amount required, so that delivery at the farm gate 
was much delayed inducing divergence between farmers and their representatives. In spite of this 
shortfall, it was decided in 2007 to hand over the procurement of cotton production inputs to 
farmers' organization. The outcome was disastrous. One input supplier, very unhappy of not 
being paid, has managed to block the Malian cotton bales at the harbour of Abidjan, seriously 
disturbing the exportation operations. For the 2008/09 campaign, the input procurement has 
passed under a inter-ministerial group. 
There is no significant change in the organization of the collection of the seedcotton production. 
In this sense, the farmers' transaction costs in selling their seedcotton seem to remain low. This 
apparent outcome must be mitigated by the fact that payment delay sometimes has become very 
long and that farmers have got to run several times after their money. Wholly speaking, these 
transactions costs have increased. 
Finally, in the area of increasing farmers' competence, the achievement of having farmers to lead 
the monitoring bodies of the cotton sectors is commendable. Such a participation, if not 
leadership, in this monitoring provides farmers capacity building far beyond the technical area of 
production. However, such a competence upgrading is only limited to a very limited fringe of the 
farmers while transparency and democracy are not yet enough consolidated in the farmers' 
 
2 Although anecdotal, what happened in Benin in 2002 deserves mentioning. It was the cotton-sector monitoring 
body led by the farmers' organization which rejected a supply contract by an international supplier after it was 
approved officially several months earlier. Great political interference resulted. 
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institutions [32]. Decision-making is difficult, informing about the rationale of the decisions 
taken is not an easy task. There is a risk of having farmer leaders isolating themselves from their 
collective organization, so that the strengthening of some farmers' leaders encompasses the risk 
of leading the whole associative process becoming more fragile. During the 2002-2006 period, 
there were many signs of stakeholders' disputes in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, even between 
and within farmers' institutions or syndicates. 
With regard to the five criteria retained to assess the satisfaction of the smallholders' constraints 
and concerns, the FACs are characterised by institutional arrangements of their cotton sector 
which have been disputed till recently. The uncertainty which prevails is a potential threat to the 
cotton production. In practice, the current institutional arrangements induce additional costs to the 
farmers but also to the whole cotton sectors at the expense of their competitiveness. The 
instability and uncertainty of the cotton sector frameworks are translated into decreasing and 
fluctuating production (Figure 1). 
5.3. Questioning the modalities and the features of the current institutional 
arrangements 
As underlined above, there were no successful institutional arrangements that took place 
immediately and they can only derive from learning-by-doing processes. In this regard, the 
current outcomes which are not very satisfactory should not lead to excessive pessimism. In the 
area of input supply by the farmers' institutions, it is reported that a collective process is taking 
place to overcome the shortfalls encountered.  
Negative experiences represent the cost to pay to reach more positive ones. It is more worthwhile 
to identify, owing to what we learned from the set up of former successful institutional 
arrangements, what went wrong in the adoption of the current arrangements; this is prerequisite 
to turn them into more positive ones. 
First of all, the lesson of gradual change in the institutional arrangements was totally ignored. 
Instead, the strategy of turning upside-down was clearly favored [19, 20, 24] with little 
justification, except the conviction that little progress would be possible within the existing 
organization of the cotton sectors. As we emphasized in reminding the construction of the "CFDT 
system" or monopsony system, the gradual move was materialized through resting cornerstones 
which were previously identified. In the advocacy of liberalization, it is assumed that pulling 
down the existing cotton companies and by splitting them into several private-owned ones 
competition is the cornerstone on which a new successful institutional framework would 
automatically take place. When finally it is acknowledged that the State would have a role to play 
in ensuring the provision of public goods [20, 22], the conditions to set up the institutional 
arrangements in this prospect are seldom considered.  
By over-emphasizing the attention paid to the price in purchasing the farmers' cotton productions, 
most of the smallholders' constraints and concerns we focused on in this paper are overlooked. 
The well-known risk aversion of the smallholders has been totally occulted. By privileging the 
level of the purchase price of the farmers' productions, little attention was paid to the risk of the 
fluctuation of this price or the risk for the farmers of not being paid. The purchase price was the 
item exclusively considered in the anticipation of the farmers' cotton income, assumed to 
necessarily increase, while the evolution of the production costs and of the expected yield 
account as much if not more. Such an attitude of privileging the purchase price factor led to 
disregard the reality of lacking or failing markets that impede reducing costs within a liberalized 
framework. 
The alliance between the stakeholders is a requisite to move towards successful institutional 
arrangements. This is a lesson we point out in analyzing the construction of the former 
institutional framework. This requisite is totally ignored. The move towards 
privatization/liberalization was imposed externally. Very formal and official denials about this 
imposition do not change this reality as perceived by the stakeholders of the FACs cotton sectors. 
As a consequence, such a radical institutional change was induced with not any alliance from any 
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stakeholder. Further worst, such a procedure forced the stakeholders to figure out institutional 
arrangements to go round the imposed institutional framework. Consequently, what actually took 
place in several FACs, as we introduced above, do not pertain to pure privatization or 
liberalization, and whose outcomes are debatable. This situation is well perceived by the 
liberalization advocators who argue that the liberalization option is not accountable for the 
current shortfalls but rather the lack of liberalization [22]. This is a statement which unveils a still 
great ignorance about the construction of institutional arrangements.  
With reference to the alliances of stakeholders which took place, it was the direct stakeholders of 
the cotton sectors who induced the institutional change, indirect ones only played the facilitating 
role by providing the needed means in order to materialize the decided change. What is going on 
demonstrates an overwhelming role from the indirect stakeholders, namely the international 
funders. This shift in the leading role, which is kind of external-centralization, cannot be efficient 
when it ignores the needed adhesion of the direct stakeholders. 
Finally, the promotion of the farmers' involvement in the monitoring of the cotton sectors still 
sounds to be sufficient to induce better outcomes to them. If this is likely necessary, it cannot be 
automatically sufficient as evidenced through some examples. The farmers' institutions have been 
at the basis of the launching of new pricing mechanisms and new calculation formulas which 
integrate farmers' production costs and real costs of the cotton companies or ginners. Since the 
private cotton companies do not accept to show up their real costs for legitimate reason of 
confidentiality while they argue the producers' ones, this leads to disputes, abandon of new 
pricing mechanisms and uncertainty for all stakeholders. This is an illustration that new 
institutional arrangements, even if they are required for very much legitimate rationale, must 
comply with economic rules and private operators' behaviours. 
6 Conclusion 
The development of the cotton production in FAC became real from 1952 onwards, as a result of 
the implementation of an institutional framework which fit better to the smallholders' constraints 
and concerns in terms of price fairness, risk aversion, lack of financial resource (encompassing 
liquidity constraint under imperfect financial market), lack of competence in new production 
mode and high transaction costs. The real adhesion of farmers to cotton production depends on 
the extent to which their constraints and concerns are taken into consideration.  
To better cope with farmers' constraints or concerns, a change of institutional arrangements is 
needed. This change implies modification in the group of players involved, in the prospect and 
sharing of benefit, in the costs associated to the relationship between players (with or without real 
transaction), in the sharing of these costs, in the perception of certainty or uncertainty and in the 
conditions to accede to goods/services. From 1952 till mid-1992, there was a sustained process of 
institutional arrangements, to gradually address farmers' constraints and concerns or to 
progressively modify the effectiveness in addressing them. This means that constraints were 
seldom coped with once for all, but all of the five we have underlined must be taken into 
consideration. It comes out that effective institutional arrangements ask for time to be set up; they 
result from experimentation, through learning-by-doing and they were not imposed by a 
dominant player and require instead alliance between stakeholders. 
Conversely, if cotton sectors perform far much worse since the mid-1990s, it's mainly because 
the institutional arrangements which have prevailed do show the opposite features of successful 
ones. These arrangements were imposed, by a dominant player; they were implemented abruptly 
without experimentation and by focussing only on one concern (price) while overlooking the 
remaining constraints. 
When considering the whole period of more than fifty years, with one long period of slowly 
constructed and successful institutional arrangements followed by a period of arrangements with 
quite questionable outcomes, it seems that these arrangements are very connected to the 
ideologies or paradigms of rural development. Under the constraint of erroneous paradigm, like 
ISSCRI International Conference "Rationales and evolutions of cotton policies", Montpellier, May 13-17, 2008 
 
15 
the one of liberalization which has prevailed from the beginning of the 1990s, it could be hard to 
expect very successful institutional arrangements. So the issue of adjusting the institutional 
arrangements for better performing cotton sectors also calls upon the challenge of determining a 
more appropriate paradigm of rural development in Africa today. 
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